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I.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

The Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to determine this
appeal due to the failure of defendants/appellants Paul K. Jun and
Ester Young Ja Jun (hereafter defendants) to file a timely notice
of appeal. Had defendants timely filed their notice of appeal, the
court would have proper appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(k).

II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Does this court lack jurisdiction to determine this appeal
due to defendants' failure to file a timely notice of appeal?
2.

If jurisdiction is proper, did the district court abuse

its discretion by denying defendants' request to defer their
payment of an amount imposed by the court as a condition to
granting defendants relief from the judgment previously entered
against them?

The standard of review is whether the district

court's ruling has no reasonable basis, Crookston v. Fire Insurance
Exchange. 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993) or was so unreasonable that it
can be classified as arbitrary and capricious, Kunzler v. O'Dell,
855 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1993).

1

III.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by plaintiff/appellee Ka Ae Park (hereafter

plaintiff) to collect an obligation owing from defendants.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
Following

defendants'

failure

to

answer

plaintiff's

interrogatories, the district court granted plaintiff's motion to
compel and required defendants to answer the interrogatories within
ten

days

and

to pay

plaintiff

$250 plus her

incurred in bringing the motion.

attorney's

fees

Following defendants' failure to

answer the interrogatories and to pay the sanction imposed by the
district court, the court granted appellee's motion for sanctions,
struck

defendants'

entered

judgment

answer,
against

dismissed
them

as

their

prayed

counterclaim,
for

in

and

appellee's

complaint. Defendants filed a motion for relief from the judgment,
and that motion was denied by the district court. Defendants filed
a second motion for relief from the judgment which the district
court granted, provided

that defendants comply

conditions no later than December 15, 1993.

fully with two

Defendants complied

with one of the two conditions but failed to comply with the
second.

By the terms of the district court's order, defendants'

failure to comply fully with both conditions by December 15, 1993
meant that their "second motion for relief from judgment or order
2
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In

compel

interrogatories, despite a stipulated extension of time to answer.
R., at pps. 4 4 - 4 8 .
6.

May

24, 1993 —

The district court entered an order

requiring defendants to answer plaintiff's interrogatories within
10 days and to pay the sum of $250 plus any fees incurred by
plaintiff in bringing her motion. R. , at pps. 53 - 54.

Defendants

never opposed plaintiff's motion to compel and never claimed that
the court's imposition of the financial sanction was improper due
to their impecuniosity.
7.

June 10, 1993 —

Plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions

due to defendants' failure to comply with the court order requiring
them to answer plaintiff's interrogatories within 10 days.
motion

for sanctions, plaintiff

In her

requested the court to strike

defendants' answer and to render default judgment or to impose such
other sanctions as may be appropriate.
8.
sanctions
previous

July 15, 1993 —
for

By minute entry, Judge Moffat imposed

defendants' failure

order.

The

R., at pps. 60 - 62.

court

to

entered

comply

with

defendants'

the

court's

default

and

indicated that the counterclaim should be dismissed and judgment
granted pursuant to the prayer of plaintiff's complaint. The court
further awarded attorney's fees and an additional sum of $500 as a
sanction against defendants.

R. , at pps. 65 - 66.

Defendants

never opposed plaintiff's motion for sanctions and never claimed
4
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Defendants never argued that imposition of the financial sanctions
was improper due to their impecuniosity.
13.

November 15, 1993 —

The district court entered an order

with respect to defendants' second motion for relief from judgment
or order that provided in part as follows:
Provided defendants comply fully with the conditions set
forth below no later than December 15, 1993, their second
motion for relief from judgment or order dated July 26,
1993 shall be granted and defendants shall be granted
relief from the judgment previously entered herein on
August 9, 1993.
The two conditions the court imposed were that defendants provide
full and complete answers to the outstanding interrogatories and
that they pay plaintiff the sum of $1,335 in attorney's fees and
sanctions.

The order further stated as follows:
If defendants have not fully complied with both
conditions set forth above by December 15, 1993,
defendants' second motion for relief from judgment or
order shall, without further notice or hearing, be deemed
denied and the judgment previously entered shall stand
and remain in full force and effect, and no further
motion for relief from the judgment and order shall be
considered by the court.

R., at pps. 138 - 140.
14.

December 15, 1993 —

Defendants submitted their answers

to the outstanding interrogatories but failed to pay any of the
$1,335

the

court

had

ordered

them

to pay

obtaining relief from the default judgment.

as

a condition

to

Defendants filed a

"Motion to Defer Payment of Sanctions" and an unsigned affidavit of
6

defendant Paul K. Jun and argued for the first time that "through
no fault of their own, [defendants] exhausted their capital and are
unable to pay the sanction amount."
15.

R., at pps. 141 - 152.

By minute entry, Judge Moffat ruled on defendants' motion

to defer payment of sanctions.

The minute entry stated in part as

follows:
The motion is denied. The court is of the opinion that
the allegations of reasons for failure to satisfy the
sanctions which were imposed are not sufficient.
In
addition the court notes that this case has been one
continual delay after another on behalf of the defendants
and the court has little faith in the credibility of the
allegations of the defendants.
It should be further
noted that the affidavit of Paul K. Jun as filed with the
court is neither signed nor notarized and therefore is
legally not sufficient and cannot be considered.
R., at pps. 166 - 168.
16.

February 8, 1994 —

The district court entered an order

denying defendants7 motion to defer payment of sanctions.

R., at

pps. 170 - 171.
17.

March 10, 1994 —

Defendants filed an ex parte motion to

extend the time to file their notice of appeal.
18.
appeal.

April

11, 1994 —

Defendants filed their notice of

R., at pps. 174 - 175.

IV.
1.

R., at p. 172.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Defendants failed to file a timely notice of appeal, and

this court lacks jurisdiction to determine the appeal.
7

2.

Defendants may not raise an equal protection argument for

the first time on appeal.
3. This court should not consider the conclusory arguments of
defendants involving pivotal issues made without citation to any
cases of any significance.
4.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

defendants7 request to defer payment of sanctions imposed by the
court.

V.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION
SINCE DEFENDANTS7 NOTICE OF APPEAL
WAS NOT TIMELY FILED
Defendants failed to file a timely notice of appeal of any
final, appealable order.

This court lacks jurisdiction and should

dismiss this appeal.
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states that an
appeal may be taken "from all final orders and judgments" of the
district court by filing a notice of appeal
allowed by Rule 4."

"within the time

Rule 4 requires the notice of appeal to be

filed "within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or
order appealed from."

8

Following entry of the judgment against them on August 9,
1993, defendants filed two post-judgment motions for relief under
Rule 60(b).

An order denying relief under Rule 60(b) is a final

appealable order.

Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768

P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989).

Under Rules 3 and 4, defendants had 30

days after the denial of their second motion for relief to file
their notice of appeal.
Pursuant to the terms of the district court / s November 15,
1993 order, defendants7 second motion for relief was deemed denied
on December 15, 1993 when defendants failed to comply fully with
the two conditions imposed by the court for granting relief from
the judgment.

The order stated as follows:

Provided defendants comply fully with the conditions set
forth below no later than December 15, 1993, their second
motion for relief from judgment or order dated July 26,
1993 shall be granted....
If defendants have not fully complied with both
conditions set forth above by December 15, 1993,
defendants7 second motion for relief from judgment or
order shall, without further notice or hearing, be deemed
denied and the judgment previously entered shall stand
and remain in full force and effect, and no further
motion for relief from the judgment and order shall be
considered by the court.
R., at pps. 138 - 140.
Defendants did not file their notice of appeal until April 11,
1994, long after the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal

9

had elapsed.1

Defendants having failed to file a timely notice of

appeal with respect to the order denying their second Rule 60(b)
motion for relief, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal
of that order.
Defendants claim that the order they are appealing is the
order of February 8, 1994 denying their motion to defer payment of
sanctions and that their notice of appeal was, therefore, timely
filed.

That order is not, however, a final, appealable order.

The

rights of the parties had already been fully resolved by the denial
of defendants7

second motion for relief from

judgment.

Their

motion to defer the payment of sanctions and the order denying that
motion were merely tangential to the essential issues between the
parties.

The order denying defendants7 motion to defer payment of

sanctions has none of the indicia of a final, appealable order.
See generally 47 Am Jur. 2d, Judgments, §1053.

See also Hase v.

Hase, 775 P. 2d 943 (Utah App. 1989) where the court held that an
order that "wholly disposed of all remaining claims between the
parties" constituted the final order from which an appeal could be
taken

and

that

a

later

consolidated

decree

and

order

merely

HJnder Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, as
late as February 14, 1994 defendants could have also requested the
trial court for an extension of time to file their notice of
appeal. They did not file their ex parte motion for an extension
until March 10, 1994. The late motion and the trial court 7 s order
pursuant to that late motion should be ignored in determining
whether defendants filed a timely notice of appeal.
10

reiterating what the court had previously ordered could not be used
to extend the time for appeal.

Id., at p. 945.2

Defendants did not file a timely notice of appeal of any
final, appealable order or judgment. This court lacks jurisdiction
to hear this appeal and should dismiss it.
POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER
DEFENDANTS' EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENT
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
Defendants7 brief contains an argument based on the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. This argument
was not presented in the district court and should be disregarded
by this court.
At no point in the district court proceedings did defendants
ever raise an argument based on the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution.

It is axiomatic that an issue not

raised in the trial court will not be addressed by the appeallate
court.

E.g., Wurst v. Department of Employment Security, 818 P.2d

1086 (Utah App. 1991) (Stating that the reviewing court will not
address an issue raised for the first time on appeal.)

2

Likewise, defendants' motion to defer payment of sanctions is
not one of the motions enumerated in Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure which extend the time for filing the notice of
appeal until after the denial of such a motion.
11

Defendants failed to present any argument to the district
court regarding the Equal Protection Clause.
that

issue, raised

for

the

first

time

on

Their argument on
appeal, should

be

disregarded.
POINT III
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER
DEFENDANTS7 CONCLUSORY ARGUMENTS
MADE WITH VIRTUALLY NO CITATION
TO ANY CASES OF ANY SIGNIFICANCE
Like their arguments presented to the trial court in support
of their motion to defer payment of sanctions, defendants in their
brief present only conclusory arguments not supported by any cases
of any significance.

Their argument should be disregarded and

their appeal dismissed.
Defendants have attempted to raise serious issues regarding
due process and equal protection and their application to allegedly
impecunious parties allegedly unable to pay sanctions imposed by
the court.

Defendants7 argument, however, is merely conclusory in

nature and totally devoid of any meaningful citation to relevant
cases, leaving both opposing counsel and this court to speculate as
to the basis and legal authority of their claims.
This court has stated that it will not consider conclusory
arguments on pivotal issues made by parties to an appeal without
citation to either the record or applicable case law.
Park City, 771 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1991).
12

Marchant v.

Defendants7 argument in

this case presents such a situation, and this court should not
consider the conclusory argument set forth by defendants in their
brief.

The court should dismiss the appeal.
POINT IV
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING DEFENDANTS7 MOTION
TO DEFER PAYMENT OF SANCTIONS

As

set

jurisdiction

forth
to

under

hear

this

Point

I

above,

appeal.

Even

this
if

court

the

court

lacks
has

jurisdiction, however, it should affirm the district court's order
denying defendants' motion to defer payment of sanctions as a
proper exercise of the district court's discretion.
An abuse of discretion occurs when there is "no reasonable
basis for the

[district court's] decision", Crookston v. Fire

Insurance Exchange, 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993) or where the
court's ruling "is so unreasonable that it can be classified as
arbitrary and capricious", Kunzler v. Q'Dellf 855 P. 2d 270, 275
(Utah App. 1993) .
The facts of this case plainly demonstrate that the trial
court had ample reason to deny defendants' request to defer paying
the sanctions previously imposed by the court and did not abuse its
discretion.

Defendants had a long history of, as the district

court put it, "playing games" (R. , at p. 88) and ignoring their
obligation to respond appropriately to discovery requests and court
13

orders.
payment

By the time it ruled on defendants7 motion to defer
of

sanctions,

the

court

was

well

justified

in

its

conclusion that it had "little faith in the credibility of the
allegations of the defendants."

R. , at p. 166.

Even if the defendants' allegations of impecuniosity were
believable and legitimate, impecuniosity alone should not be a
sufficient basis for relieving recalcitrant and neglectful parties
from proper sanctions imposed by the court for the parties' failure
to respond to prior court orders.

Even impecunious litigants who

file an affidavit of impecuniosity pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 217-3

are not relieved of all financial burdens with respect to

litigation.

E.g., Roberts v. Erickson, 851 P.2d 643 (Utah 1993)

(The fees and costs excused by the filing of an affidavit of
impecuniosity do not include the costs of preparing transcripts.)
The trial

court did

not abuse

its discretion

in denying

defendants' motion to defer payment of sanctions. The court should
affirm the district court's denial of that motion.

VI.
For the

foregoing

CONCLUSION

reasons, plaintiff/appellee

Ka Ae

Park

respectfully requests this court to dismiss this appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, if jurisdiction is proper, to

14

affirm the district court's denial of defendants' motion to defer
payment of sanctions.
Dated this

^ °-

day of December, 1994.
ROBERT H. REES, P.C.

Ttobe^t H. Rees
Attorney for p l a i n t i f f / a p p e l l e e
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